tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1973938108988281018.post4242225037316498816..comments2024-02-06T03:23:37.329-08:00Comments on No Jesus, No Peas: A Perfectly Cromulent Inoculation against Plantinga's ProofJames Sweethttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17212877636980569324noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1973938108988281018.post-22092195054500173612010-10-01T08:07:10.584-07:002010-10-01T08:07:10.584-07:00Yeah that whole "perfectly good" thing h...Yeah that whole "perfectly good" thing has been nothing but a logical headache for religion. You've got thousands of years of tradition supporting the idea of jealous, capricious gods for whom begging and supplication seem like a might good idea, and then you try to superimpose this "But actually there's only one of them, and He's a really nice guy!" thing onto it... doesn't work out so well logically.James Sweethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17212877636980569324noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1973938108988281018.post-76584979224416286822010-10-01T07:56:46.097-07:002010-10-01T07:56:46.097-07:00Of course, even if the Ontological argument was va...Of course, even if the Ontological argument was valid, my response would be, "So what?". <br /><br />OK, we would've proven the existence of a Maximal being (as opposed to a Predacon being, I guess) about which we know absolutely nothing other than it logically exists. Would this knowledge serve any useful purpose? Would this be a reason pray to said unnamed maximal being? <br /><br />Not really. Assuming an all powerful, all knowing, perfect being (a concept which is illogical in and of itself), it seems illogical to think that we could affect its thought processes or actions. That would imply an imperfect being requiring our input in order for it to make a maximal decision. This assumes it is possible for us to have an actual free will of our own that wasn't entirely the result of (and thus directed by) the creator.<br /><br />Ontological argument: Multi-yawn.Karl Withakayhttp://blog.cordialdeconstruction.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1973938108988281018.post-29832656774341791712010-09-29T06:10:56.439-07:002010-09-29T06:10:56.439-07:00Yeah, I pretty much agree with that. It's dif...Yeah, I pretty much agree with that. It's difficult, because the concept of "possible worlds" seems to me to be endlessly problematic. (It's that same ambiguous "possible worlds" concept that allows David Chalmer's interesting-but-flawed argument in favor of dualism) Do we mean by "possible worlds" anything that we can imagine? Is it the distributed set of true/false values for every conceivable proposition? (In which case that would allow logically contradictory, even unimaginable possible worlds) Is it the set of all worlds that would not violate our current understanding of the laws of the universe? <br /><br />The Wikipedia article on the philosophical concept of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_worlds" rel="nofollow">"possible world"</a> is of no help to me here.<br /><br />Oh, and incidentally, I think that if Wikipedia has defined "possible world"'s relation to modal logic properly, than my initial objection to Plantinga's proof -- that he was actually creating a hierarchy of possible worlds of possible worlds -- was right to begin with. According to Wikipedia, in modal logic:<br /><br /><i>Possible propositions are those that are true in at least one possible world</i><br /><br />If that is true, than Plantinga has abused modal logic like a Catholic priest with a choirgirl. Maximal greatness is a trait that applies to multiple possible worlds. So when he says "Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified," if I substitute the definition of "possibly" in modal logic (according to Wikipedia) and his definition of maximal greatness, we get this meaningless bullshit:<br /><br />"In at least one possible world, there is a being who exhibits maximal excellence in all possible worlds."<br /><br />What the fuck does that even mean? Nothing.<br /><br />So perhaps this post was superfluous, and my initial objection to Plantinga's proof was spot on.<br /><br />I really need to find a modal logic expert to talk with about this. I must have something wrong here, because this seems like a basic flaw in Plantinga's application of the S5 axiom -- if I were correct, surely other philosophers would have called him on it?James Sweethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17212877636980569324noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1973938108988281018.post-76901239035540311802010-09-28T13:49:24.843-07:002010-09-28T13:49:24.843-07:00I can't get past premise 1 of the Ontological ...I can't get past premise 1 of the Ontological argument.<br /><br />Omnipotence and omniscience are both logical absurdities, and "wholly good" is a subjective concept which is not defined logically. <br /><br />All the following premises fail (at least) because premise 1 is invalid (if not for other reasons as well).Karl Withakayhttp://blog.cordialdeconstruction.comnoreply@blogger.com